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RECENT DECISIONS
sel or its owner.9 Thus, in effect, an Americati seaman became a
foreign seaman as soon as he stepped on board a foreign vessel, and
if he chanced to work on many ships in the course of a day, his
nationality would change in each instance to that of the ship on
which he was working. '0 The federal courts, on the other hand,
have held that an American seaman so employed is entitled to the
benefits of the Act." The purport of the Act being to benefit Ameri-
can seamen, to deny relief merely because the injury occurred on a
ship of foreign registry would be a strained and unreasonable
application of it.12
R.L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE
RATES FOR PERSONAL SERVICES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-Plain-
tiffs were all registered under the Packers and Stockyards Act,'
and comprised the entire membership of the Omaha Livestock Ex-
change. In an effort to secure a better return on their respective
investments, plaintiffs filed a new schedule of rates with the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. The latter, on his own motion, issued an order
suspending the operation of the proposed schedule and held a public
hearing on the reasonableness of the proposed rates. The Livestock
Exchange then sought an injunction restraining the Secretary of
Agriculture on the ground that the Act in question if construed to
give the Secretary of Agriculture such power would be in contra-
vention of the Fifth Amendment.2 Held, that Congress has power
to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to fix the rate of com-
pensation for personal services where the services are rendered in a
business that is subject to public regulation. Tagg Bros. and Moor-
head et al. v. U. S. et al., 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1929).
The plaintiff relied upon Tyson v. Bonton 3 and Ribnik v.
McBride,4 contending that those cases held that the rate of com-
pensation for personal services cannot be regulated. But Justice
'See Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 24 F. (2nd) 591 (D. C.,
Wash., 1927).
20 Zarowitch v. F. Jarka Co., 21 F. (2nd), 187 (D. C., N. Y., 1927);
Mahoney v. International Elevating Co., 23 F. (2nd) 130 (D. C., N. Y.
1927) ; aff'd 26 F. (2nd) 1019 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928).
'Id., Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., supra note 6.
'-Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., ibid.
IU. S. C. A., Tit. 7, Secs. 201-217, 42 Stat. 159, 163-168.2 U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
2273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927). For a detailed and authoritative
consideration of this subject see Finkelstein, From Mum v. Illlhois to Tyson
v. Banton, A Study In the Judicial Process, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 769.
'277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928). See also notes (1928) 3 St.
John's L. Rev. 104 and (1929) 3 St. John's L. Rev. 244.
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Brandeis, writing for the court, disposed of this contention by stat-
ing, "This court did not hold in Tyson v. Bonton and Ribnik v.
McBride that charges for personal services cannot be regulated. The
question upon which this court divided in those cases was whether
the services sought to be regulated were then affected with a public
interest. Whether a business is of that class depends not upon the
amount of capital it employs but upon the character of -the services
which those who are conducting it engage to render." 5 Whether
this be the test in the determination of the propriety of rate regula-
tion or whether we adopt Justice Holmes's view "* * * that, subject
to compensation when compensation is due, -the legislature may
forbid or restrict any business when it has a force of public opinion
behind it," 6 the conclusion reached by the Court is a just one. As
stated by the Court in the instant case, -the plaintiffs performed an
indispensable service in the interstate commerce in livestock. They
enjoyed a substantial monopoly. They had eliminated rate competi-
tion and had substituted therefor rates fixed by agreement among
themselves, without consulting the shippers and others who pay the
rates. They had bound themselves to maintain uniform charges re-
gardless of the difference in experience, skill and industry.
The purpose of the regulation attacked is to prevent their ser-
vice from thus becoming an undue burden upon, and obstruction of,
that commerce. In Stafford v. Wallace,7 the Court said: "The chief
evil feared is the monopoly of the packers, enabling them unduly and
arbitrarily to lower prices to the shippers who sell, and unduly and
arbitrarily to increase the prices to the consumer who buys. * * * The
act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of the country as great
national public utilities to permit the flow of commerce from the
ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It
assumes that they conduct a business affected by a public use on a
national character and subject to national regulation. That it is a
business within the power of regulation by legislative action needs
no discussion; that has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illi-
nois." 8 It is submitted that this case is in harmony with recent
expressions of the Supreme Court on questions of social control of
industry.9
W. L. W.
'Instant case at p. 438, 9, 50 Sup. Ct. 224.
'Tyson v. Banton, supra note 3 at 448, 47 Sup. Ct. at 434.
7258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922).
'Ibid. at 514, 515, 516, 42 Sup. Ct. at 401, 402.
'It will be interesting to note what effect, if any, the recent change in
the personnel of the Supreme Court will have on the course of decisions test-
ing the validity of legislation seeking to control and regulate industries not
yet adjudicated as "a business affected with a public interest and subject
to public regulation."
